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Abstract
In random expected utility (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2006), the distribution
of preferences is uniquely recoverable from random choice. This paper shows
through two examples that such uniqueness fails in general if risk preferences
are random but do not conform to expected utility theory. In the first, non-
uniqueness obtains even if all preferences are confined to the betweenness class
(Dekel, 1986) and are suitably monotone. The second example illustrates random
choice behavior consistent with random expected utility that is also consistent
with random non-expected utility. On the other hand, we find that if risk pref-
erences conform to weighted utility theory (Chew, 1983) and are monotone in
first-order stochastic dominance, random choice again uniquely identifies the dis-
tribution of preferences. Finally, we argue that, depending on the domain of risk
preferences, uniqueness may be restored if joint distributions of choice across a
limited number of feasible sets are available.
Keywords: random choice, random utility/preference, non-expected utility,
identification
1 Introduction
A classic model of random choice is random utility theory. It can be interpreted
as follows. In a heterogeneous population, suppose each individual maximizes her
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preference. Given any feasible set D of alternatives, as different individual might
make different choice, the choice behavior of this population is summarized by a
distribution over D, which is determined by the distribution of preferences in the
population.1 In the context of choice under risk, a special case of the model is
random expected utility (REU). All individuals in the population are expected
utility maximizers, but their risk attitudes are not identical. Under REU, the
distribution of preferences is uniquely recoverable from random choice (Gul and
Pesendorfer, 2006). In other words, when an analyst observes only the choice
frequencies for this population then, under the assumption that each individual’s
preference conforms to expected utility theory, she is able to identify a unique
distribution of preferences consistent with the observed behavior.
The focus on expected utility preferences is natural as a first step, but is not
completely satisfactory in light of its well-known descriptive failures, such as the
Allais paradox. One might suspect that the observed random choice of lotteries
could be rationalized by random non-expected utility but not by REU. On the
other hand, in an abstract choice setting, it is well-known that two distinct
random preferences can rationalize the same random choice behavior.2 Hence
if risk preferences are unrestricted at all, random choice of lotteries does not
identify the underlying distribution of preferences uniquely.
Nonetheless, even if a modeler wants to deviate from expected utility the-
ory, she does not need to embrace all kinds of risk preferences. Many classes
of non-expected utility preferences have certain structures for tractability and
are consistent with many stylized behaviors violating expected utility theory.
Therefore, a natural question is if the uniqueness result of REU remains true
when we make a small deviation from expected utility? Moreover, if a class
of non-expected utility does not yield unique identification, how can we restore
uniqueness by enriching the observable behavior? This paper aims to respond to
these questions.
Firstly, we show by example that random choice may not identify a unique
distribution of preferences when risk preferences are random and restricted but
do not conform to expected utility theory. In particular, we have three find-
1Random utility theory can also model the stochastic behavior of a single agent. It hypothesizes
that the agent’s preference is random according to a fixed distribution. Facing a feasible set of
alternatives, she first perceives the realized preference and then makes a rational choice. Hence, from
ex-ante point of view, her choice appears random.
2See Barbera´ and Pattanaik (1986) for an example of random choice that can be rationalized by
more than one random utility.
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ings for non-uniqueness: (i) non-uniqueness obtains even if risk preferences are
confined to the betweenness (implicit expected utility) class, developed by Dekel
(1986) and Chew (1983, 1989), and are all monotonic with respect to first-order
stochastic dominance; (ii) non-uniqueness obtains even if risk preferences are
confined to the weighted utility class (Chew, 1983); (iii) random choice may be
rationalized by both REU and random non-expected utility. Thus, non-unique
identification seems to be a generic problem for random non-expected utility
models.
The third finding above demonstrates a subtle difference between the ex-
pected utility hypothesis at the individual and population levels. Even if the
observed choice frequencies from a population can be rationalized by random ex-
pected utility, it is still possible that no individual in the population is an expected
utility maximizer. Therefore, while violating any axiom of REU implies that not
all individuals are expected utility maximizers, consistency with REU does not
validate the expected utility hypothesis at the individual level either.
We then deepen our analysis under weighted utility theory and provide some
positive results on restoring unique identification. While random weighted util-
ity is not uniquely identified from random choice in general, we may regain
uniqueness by requiring all preferences to be monotonic with respect to first-
order stochastic dominance. We provide a formal argument for the case of three
prizes. In some choice settings, for example, when the prizes are monetary, such
monotonicity is normative appealing. Therefore, if unique identification is de-
sirable for a modeler, random weighted utility with monotonicity in stochastic
dominance may be a good choice for random non-expected utility models.
Without such monotonicity, we can still uniquely identify random weighted
utility if we suitably enrich the observable behavior. In the case of three prizes, we
show that the distribution of weighted utility preferences is uniquely recoverable
from joint distribution of choice across three binary menus. Note that under
the classic notion of random choice, only the distribution of choice from each
feasible set is observable. The joint distribution of choice across any two sets is
not. Under REU, random choice implicitly reveals all joint choice probabilities
and so pins down a unique distribution of preferences. Once we deviate from
expected utility, random choice no longer discloses such information. Thus, non-
uniqueness obtains in general. If we can observe joint choice frequencies across
choice sets, we will be able to improve identification. Our finding suggests that
when risk preferences are sufficiently restricted, joint choice distributions across
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a small number of menus suffice for unique identification.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to address the identi-
fication of random non-expected utility from a decision-theoretic perspective.3
The paper does not aim to dive deep into any particular model of random non-
expected utility. Instead, it is mainly illustrative. We argue that some classes
of non-expected utility preferences do not admit unique identification of random
utility, and some do. We suggest that allowing joint choice probabilities as the
observable can help to regain uniqueness. To convey these points easily, we con-
duct all the analyses in a three-prize setting so that a risk preference can be
visualized on a two-dimensional plane. While risk preferences in this paper all
belong to the betweenness class or a subclass, we acknowledge the existence of
many other types of non-expected utility widely used in economics but not con-
sidered here yet. Future work may focus on a particular class of risk preferences
and perform a more detailed analysis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces random
implicit expected utility (RIEU). Section 3 provides two examples of two distinct
RIEUs that induce the same random choice. Hence the distribution of risk
preferences is not uniquely identified. Section 4 points out a class of non-expected
utility that yields unique identification of random utility. It also discusses the
reason for general non-uniqueness and demonstrates that uniqueness may be
restored if choice data are suitably enriched. In the appendix, we point out three
behavioral properties of RIEU.
2 Random Utility Model
2.1 Basic modeling approach of random choice and
random utility
We first review the general random utility model. There is a universal space of
choice alternatives X. A choice set, or called a menu, is a finite subset of X. Let
D denote the collection of all menus.
3Lu (2020) studies a random utility model where each individual has an ambiguity-averse pref-
erence over Anscombe-Aumann acts. Thus, the population’s choice of acts is not consistent with
random subjective expected utility. Nonetheless, he considers the set of all lotteries over acts as the
choice domain and assumes that each individual is still an expected-utility maximizer when evaluating
lotteries. Hence his identification result essentially follows from the uniqueness of REU.
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Choice from a menu is modeled as a random set. In particular, for any
A,D ∈ D, we denote by ρD(A) the probability that A is the set of all optimal
alternatives in D. To ensure feasibility, we require that if ρD(A) > 0 then A is a
nonempty subset of D. Let Π be the set of all simple probability measures over
the class of all finite subsets of X. The observable choice behavior is summarized
by a random choice correspondence.4
Definition 1. A random choice correspondence (RCC) is a function ρ : D → Π
with ρD({A ∈ D : ∅ 6= A ⊂ D}) = 1 for all D ∈ D.
A preference relation % is a complete and transitive binary relation over X.
For each menu D ∈ D, let M(D,%) denote the set of all optimal options in D
according to %; that is,
M(D,%) := {x ∈ D : x % y ∀ y ∈ D}.
Fix a set of preference relations Ω. Let N(D,A) denote the set of preferences
in Ω under which A is the set of all optimal options in D; that is,
N(D,A) := {%∈ Ω : A =M(D,%)} ⊂ Ω.
Let
C := {N(D,A) : A,D ∈ D}, (1)
and let F(C) denote the smallest field that contains every element of C.
A random utility, or called a random preference, is a finitely additive prob-
ability measure µ on (Ω,F(C)). Say that ρ is rationalized by µ if ρD(A) equals
the probability under µ that A is the set of all optimal alternatives in D.
Definition 2. Random choice correspondence ρ is rationalized by random utility
µ if, for all D,A ∈ D,
ρD(A) = µ(N(D,A)).
4We consider multi-valued random choice to avoid dealing with ties in choice. Literature often
studies single-valued random choice. Namely, the choice out of A is summarized by a distribution
over A, but not over the class of subsets of A. With single-valued random choice, a random utility
model must assume that ties occur with zero probability, or impose a tie-breaking rule. Otherwise,
the connection between the observable and the model would be loose.
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2.2 Random utility models for choice under risk and
identification problem
This paper exclusively focuses on random choice under risk. There is a finite set
of prizes denoted W = {w1, w2, · · · , wN+1} for N ≥ 1. The objects of choice are
lotteries over W . Let ∆ := {p ∈ RN+ :
∑N
n=1 p
n ≤ 1} be the set of all lotteries.
For each p ∈ ∆, its nth coordinate pn is the probability of winning the prize wn,
for all n = 1, · · · , N , and pN+1 := 1−
∑N
n=1 p
n is the probability of winning the
prize wN+1. A lottery assigning probability one to the prize w ∈ W is denoted
by w.
Let X = ∆, and then we can define a random risk preference µ as before. The
identification problem concerns if random choice of lotteries ρ identifies a unique
distribution of risk preferences µ. That is, if ρ is rationalizable by both µ and
µ′, is it necessary that µ = µ′? The answer to this question crucially depends on
the domain of preferences Ω.
In order to facilitate the analysis, we assume that there are only three prizes
(N = 2) throughout the paper. Thus a lottery is identified as a point in a
probability simplex in R2, and a risk preference can be described by its indiffer-
ence map. For an expected-utility preference, the indifference sets are all linear
and parallel to each other. A well-known generalization of expected utility is
betweenness preference, which relaxes the parallelism of indifference curves.
Definition 3 (Dekel, 1986). A binary relation % over ∆ is called a betweenness
preference if it satisfies:
1. % is complete and transitive.
2. There exist best and worst elements in ∆ which are the sure prizes in W .
3. If p ≻ q ≻ r, then there exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that αp + (1− α)q ∼ r.
4. (Betweenness)
If p ≻ q, then p ≻ αp + (1− α)q ≻ q for all α ∈ (0, 1).
If p ∼ q, then p ∼ αp + (1− α)q ∼ q for all α ∈ (0, 1).
A notable feature of such preference is that for any p ∈ ∆, the indifference
set {q ∈ ∆ : q ∼ p} is the intersection of a hyperplane and ∆. Moreover,
this hyperplane divides ∆ into the upper and the lower contour sets of p (i.e.
{q ∈ ∆ : q ≻ p} and {q ∈ ∆ : q ≺ p}). However, two indifference sets need not be
parallel (i.e. their corresponding hyperplanes can intersect outside the simplex).
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(a) (b)
I(p) I(p)
w w
w¯
w w
w¯
p p
Figure 1
A stylized betweenness preference is depicted in (a). The indifference set containing p,
denoted I(p), is the intersection of a straight line and the simplex. Two indifference sets
can be non-parallel. A stylized expected-utility preference is depicted in (b), where all
indifference sets are parallel. (Arrows indicate the direction of increasing preference.)
If we strengthen Betweenness to Independence:
∀α ∈ (0, 1], ∀p, q, r,∈ ∆, p % q ⇔ αp + (1− α)r % αq + (1− α)r,
then % becomes an expected-utility preference whose indifference sets are all
parallel to each other. See Figure 1 as examples of betweenness preference and
expected-utility preference in the Marschak-Machina triangle.
Each betweenness preference has an implicit expected utility representation
which we state in Appendix A. Thus, if Ω is the set of all betweenness preferences,
we call µ random implicit expected utility (RIEU).
All random preferences considered in this paper are RIEUs. We can further
restrict Ω by considering special cases of betweenness preferences. We will also
consider monotonicity in first-order stochastic dominance. It requires an exoge-
nous and fixed ranking of prizes. And then for every possible preference %, p % q
if p is obtained from q by shifting probability mass from a worse prize to a better
prize (i.e. p first-order stochastic dominates q).
3 Non-Uniqueness of RIEU
In general, an RCC may be rationalized by more than one RIEU. We show
this through two examples. In particular, the first example shows that non-
uniqueness obtains even if risk preferences are all monotonic with respect to
first-order stochastic dominance. The second example illustrates random choice
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consistent with random expected utility that can also be rationalized by more
than one random weighted utility, a special case of RIEU.
3.1 Example 1
We define two RIEUs µ and µ′ as follows. Under µ, the realized preference
is either %1 or %2 with equal probability. Figure 2 depicts their indifference
maps. Under µ′, the realized preference is either %′1 or %
′
2 with equal probability.
Figure 3 depicts their indifference maps.
Note that these four preferences have identical indifference set of w3. Above
that set, %1 and %
′
1 have the same indifference map, and so do %2 and %
′
2. Below
that set, %1 and %
′
2 have the same indifference map, and so do %2 and %
′
1.
Below we provide numerical representations of %i and %
′
i, for i ∈ {1, 2}. In
particular, %1 and %2 both follow weighted utility theory (Chew, 1983), which
is a special case of betweenness preference. Weighted utility preferences are
represented by the function
V (p) =
∑N+1
n=1 p
ng(wn)u(wn)∑N+1
n=1 p
ng(wn)
,
where u(·) and g(·) are real-valued functions defined on W , and g is non-zero
and nonnegative (or nonpositive).
We have assumed N = 2. Let u(·) be such that u(w1) = 0, u(w2) = 1, and
u(w3) =
1
2 . Let g1(·) be such that g1(w1) = g1(w2) = 1 and g1(w3) =
1
2 , and
let g2(·) be such that g2(w1) = g2(w2) = 1 and g2(w3) = 2. Let Vi(·) be the
weighted utility function defined by u and gi for i ∈ {1, 2}; that is,
V1(p) =
p2 + [(1− p1 − p2)× 12 ×
1
2 ]
p1 + p2 + [(1− p1 − p2)× 12 ]
and V2(p) =
p2 + [(1− p1 − p2)× 2× 12 ]
p1 + p2 + [(1 − p1 − p2)× 2]
.
Define utility function V ′i (·) for i ∈ {1, 2} such that
V ′1(p) =
{
V1(p) if V1(p) ≥
1
2 ,
V2(p) otherwise,
and
V ′2(p) =
{
V2(p) if V2(p) ≥
1
2 ,
V1(p) otherwise.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, Vi represents %i, and V
′
i represents %
′
i. Obviously, these four
8
(a) (b)
w1
w3
w2
x1
x2
q′
p′
q
p
w1
w3
w2
x1
x2
q′
p′
q
p
Figure 2
(a): The preference %1 is represented by the weighted utility function V1. The worst
lottery is w1 and the best lottery is w2. All indifference curves intersect at x1 = (−
1
2
,− 1
2
).
(b): The preference %2 is represented by the weighted utility function V2. The worst
lottery is w1 and the best lottery is w2. All indifference curves intersect at x2 = (1, 1).
(a) (b)
w1
w3
w2
x1
x2
q′
p′
q
p
w1
w3
w2
x1
x2
q′
p′
q
p
Figure 3
(a): The preference %′
1
is represented by the utility function V ′
1
. The worst lottery is w1
and the best lottery is w2. For lotteries which are better than w3, their indifference curves
intersect at x1 = (−
1
2
,− 1
2
). For lotteries which are worse than w3, their indifference curves
intersect at x2 = (1, 1).
(b): The preference %′
2
is represented by the utility function V ′
2
. The worst lottery is w1
and the best lottery is w2. For lotteries which are better than w3, their indifference curves
intersect at x2 = (1, 1). For lotteries which are worse than w3, their indifference curves
intersect at x1 = (−
1
2
,− 1
2
).
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preferences all are betweenness preferences.5 They also agree on the ranking of
prizes: w1 is the worst prize, and w2 is the best prize. Moreover, if we define
first-order stochastic dominance based on this ranking of prizes, then under all
these preferences, p is better than q whenever p dominates q.6
RCC ρ is rationalized by µ if and only if it is rationalized by µ′. To see this,
suppose that lottery p is such that V1(p) ≥
1
2 . Then V2(p) ≥
1
2 . For any other
lottery q, p %1 q ⇔ p %
′
1 q and p %2 q ⇔ p %
′
2 q. Similarly, if V1(p) <
1
2 ,
then p %1 q ⇔ p %
′
2 q and p %2 q ⇔ p %
′
1 q. Since µ(%i) = µ
′(%′j) for all
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, the probability that p is better than q is the same under µ and µ′.
It is straightforward to extend the argument to show that, for any menu D and
A ⊂ D, the probability that A is the set of all optimal lotteries in D is the same
under µ and µ′.
Therefore, RCC induced by µ can be rationalized by at least two RIEUs. We
conclude that, under RIEU, random choice may not identify a unique distribution
of preferences. It is true even if we impose monotonicity in stochastic dominance.
Proposition 1. There exists a random choice correspondence rationalizable by
more than one random implicit expected utility.
3.2 Example 2
We will review in Section 4 that a random choice correspondence cannot be
rationalized by two different random expected utilities (REU). However, it might
be rationalizable by REU and also by random non-expected utility. The following
example illustrates. In particular, it shows that random expected utility and
random weighted utility (RWU) can induce identical random choice.
When there are only three prizes, each weighted utility preference (Chew,
1983) is characterized by (i) a point outside the Marschak-Machina triangle at
which all indifference curves intersect, and (ii) the direction of increasing prefer-
ence (either clockwise or counterclockwise).7
5In fact, %′1 and %
′
2 both follow semi-weighted utility (Chew, 1989). A key geometric feature of
such preference is that, there are at most two points outside the Marschak-Machina triangle at which
two indifference curves can intersect. Our example illustrates that non-uniqueness obtains even if we
further confine risk preferences to the class of semi-weighted utility.
6In Figures 2 and 3, preferences increase when we shift a lottery toward northwest. Therefore,
they are monotonic with respect to first-order stochastic dominance.
7Here, we exclude expected utility from the class of weighted utility instead of viewing it as a
special case. That is, we mean “strict” weighted utility.
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Construct RWU ν1 as follows (see Figure 4). Fix a circle surrounding the
triangle. Let all possible intersection points of indifference curves be distributed
uniformly on the circle. Moreover, conditional on any intersection point, let the
direction of increasing preference be clockwise or counterclockwise with equal
probability.
Figure 5 illustrates the implication of ν1 for random choice. Suppose that ρ
is rationalized by ν1. Take any p, q, r ∈ ∆. Taking p as the vertex, let α be the
angle (in degrees) formed by these lotteries (∡qpr = α◦). It can be shown that
ρ{p,q,r}(p) =
1
2
(
1− α180
)
.
Let ν2 be a uniform distribution over expected utility preferences. Then,
under ν2, the probability that p is optimal in {p, q, r} is also
1
2
(
1− α180
)
. In fact,
for any p ∈ ∆, ν1 and ν2 induce the identical distribution over the class of lower
contour sets {p′ ∈ ∆ : p % p′}. Therefore, ν1 and ν2 induce the same random
choice.
Note that when constructing ν1, the circle surrounding the triangle is chosen
arbitrarily. By choosing a different circle, we can construct another RWU that
rationalizes the same ρ. Thus, non-uniqueness obtains even if all preferences are
confined to the (strict) weighted utility class.
Proposition 2. There exists a random choice correspondence rationalizable by
more than one random weighted utility. There exists a random choice correspon-
dence rationalizable by both random expected utility and random weighted utility.
Suppose that an analyst aims to test expected utility theory at the individual
level, but only has choice data at the group level. Then she might consider testing
REU theory instead. However, while the consistency between observed random
choice and REU is necessary for all individuals to be expected-utility maximizers,
it is not sufficient. Our example illustrates that, even if the observed behavior
satisfies all the axioms of REU, it could be that no individual in the population
is an expected-utility maximizer.
This observation connects to classical demand theory. It is known that, even
if each consumer behaves irrationally, aggregate demand could satisfy the weak
axiom of revealed preference, even be consistent with maximization of a single
preference (Becker, 1962; Grandmont, 1992). Our result here is an analogy if
we view expected utility theory as a rational choice behavior under risk. The
example demonstrates that if individuals violate the independence axiom in di-
verse directions, then their irrational behaviors “cancel out”. Hence the observed
population choice could be fully rational.
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(a) (b)
w1
w3
w2
x1
w1
w3
w2
x2
Figure 4
(a): The preference follows weighted utility theory. All indifference curves intersect at x1,
and the preference increases counterclockwise.
(b): The preference follows weighted utility theory. All indifference curves intersect at x2,
and the preference increases clockwise.
p
q
r
D
A
F
C
BE
α◦
Figure 5
Under ν1, the realized preference ranks p optimal in D ≡ {p, q, r} if and only if either (i)
the indifference curves intersect at some point on arc ÂBC and the preference increases
clockwise, or (ii) the indifference curves intersect at some point on arc D̂EF and the
preference increases counterclockwise. Because all possible intersection points distribute
uniformly on the circle, the realized point lies on ÂBC ∪ D̂EF with probability 1 − α
180
.
Because the direction of increasing preference is clockwise or counterclockwise with equal
probability, ρD(p) =
1
2
(
1− α
180
)
if ρ is rationalized by ν1.
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r1
r2
w¯
w
w
x
pa
m˜a = am˜1 + (1− a)m˜0
m˜1
m˜0
1− a
a
Figure 6
The best and worst prizes, w¯ and w , are identified with the points (0, 1) and (0,−1)
respectively. The mediocre prize w is identified with (−1, 0). The intersection point of the
indifference curves is x. The slopes of the lines
←→
xw¯ and ←→xw are m˜1 and m˜0 respectively.
The lottery pa equals aw¯+ (1− a)w, and the slope of its indifference curve equals am˜1 +
(1 − a)m˜0.
4 Restoring Uniqueness
This section provides some positive results on the unique identification of ran-
dom non-expected utility. We find one class of non-EU preferences under which
random choice identifies underlying distribution of preferences uniquely. Then
we discuss the reason for general non-uniqueness and suggest how to enrich the
observable to improve identification.
4.1 Random weighted utility with monotonicity in
stochastic dominance
Suppose that W = {w,w, w¯}, where w¯ is the best prize, and w the worst. As
shown in Figure 6, identify w¯ and w with the points (0, 1) and (0,−1) in R2
respectively, and let the point (−1, 0) denote w. If a weighted utility preference
13
is monotone with respect to first-order stochastic dominance, the intersection
point of the indifference curves must lie in the green or blue area in the figure.
If it lies in the green area, the preference increases counterclockwise. If it lies in
the blue area, the preference increases clockwise.
We can depict the possible locations of the intersection point in the following
way. Draw a line passing w with slope m0, and another line passing w¯ with
slope m1. The intersection of these two lines lies in the green or blue area
if and only if (m0,m1) ∈ [−1, 1]
2. Therefore, a random weighted utility with
monotonicity in first-order stochastic dominance can be identified with a random
vector (m˜0, m˜1) ∈ R
2 whose support is [−1, 1]2.
For any a ∈ (0, 1), let pa = aw¯+(1−a)w. The slope of the indifference curve
of pa is equal to am˜1+(1−a)m˜0 (see Figure 6). The probability that pa is chosen
over another lottery q is equal to the probability that the slope of the indifference
curve of pa is less than the slope of
←→paq (i.e. q lies below the indifference curve
of pa). Therefore, we can recover the distribution of am˜1 + (1 − a)m˜0 for any
a ∈ (0, 1) from random choice. This allows us to pin down all the joint moments
of m˜0 and m˜1.
To find out the moments, fix any natural number n. Take any n+ 1 distinct
b0, · · · , bn ∈ (0, 1). For each k ∈ {0, · · · , n}, we can compute E[(m˜1 + bkm˜0)
n].
Observe that
E[(m˜1 + bkm˜0)
n] = E[m˜n1 ] + · · ·+
(
n
j
)
b
j
kE[m˜
n−j
1 m˜
j
0] + · · ·+ b
n
kE[m˜
n
0 ].
Hence we have a system of linear equations for the unknown moments E[m˜n−j1 m˜
j
0],
0 ≤ j ≤ n:

1 · · ·
(
n
j
)
b
j
0 · · · b
n
0
...
. . .
...
... · · ·
(
n
j
)
b
j
k · · · b
n
k
...
. . .
...
1 · · ·
(
n
j
)
b
j
n · · · bnn


×


E[m˜n1 ]
...
E[m˜n−j1 m˜
j
0]
...
E[m˜n0 ]


=


E[(m˜1 + b0m˜0)
n]
...
E[(m˜1 + bkm˜0)
n]
...
E[(m˜1 + bnm˜0)
n]


.
The (n + 1)-by-(n + 1) matrix on the left-hand side is equivalent to a square
Vandermonde matrix. It is invertible as long as all b0, · · · , bn are distinct. Thus
this system of linear equations has a unique solution. Consequently, random
choice pins down E[m˜i1m˜
j
0] for any nonnegative integers i and j.
Now the identification problem translates into a classic moment problem: if
all the joint moments are given, is there a unique joint distribution that generates
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these moments? The answer is yes in our case because the support of (m˜0, m˜1)
is compact. A distribution with a compact support is uniquely determined by
its moments.8 Note that without first-order stochastic dominance, the support
would not be bounded. So the argument is not valid for general random weighted
utility, and as shown in Section 3, uniqueness fails.9 Our result here shows
that stochastic dominance may help restoring unique identification when risk
preferences do not conform to expected utility theory.
Proposition 3. Suppose that there are three prizes, and the best and worst
ones are prespecified. Then a random choice correspondence is rationalized by
at most one random weighted utility under which all possible risk preferences are
monotonic with respect to first-order stochastic dominance.
This result is valid for local random choice data. The above identification
strategy works if we observe random choice from menus {pa, q} for all a in an
arbitrary open subset of [0, 1] and all q in a neighborhood of pa. Note that the
identification of REU has a similar property. Fixing any p, random choice from
menu {p, q, r} for all q, r in a neighborhood of p is sufficient to pin down REU.
4.2 Random joint choice across menus
The lack of unique identification implies that random choice does not fully cap-
ture the implications of a random utility model. Sometimes we can add more
assumptions into a model to improve identification. However, a modeler may
find those assumptions unappealing, and the actual choice data may not be con-
sistent with a more constrained model. Another way to restore uniqueness, as
demonstrated in this section, is to enrich the observable.
Under the classic notion of random choice, the distribution of choice out of
each menu is observable. Although there are infinitely many menus in our setting,
random choice is by no means rich choice data in general. To see this, we first
review how the identification of REU works. In contrast to Proposition 1, when
all possible preferences conform to expected utility theory then random choice
identifies a unique distribution of preferences.
8It can be proved by the Stone-Weierstrass theorem, which implies that any continuous function
on a compact subset of a multi-dimensional Euclidean space can be uniformly approximated by poly-
nomials.
9In general, two different distributions can generate identical moments. The moment problem has
been studied for decades. See Kleiber and Stoyanov (2013) for a recent study.
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Theorem 1 (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2006). A random choice correspondence is
rationalized by at most one random expected utility.
We suggest the reason for this difference between REU and RIEU. The key
concerns the joint distribution of choice across two or more menus. Such infor-
mation is implicitly revealed through random choice under REU, but not under
RIEU. A brief proof of Theorem 1 demonstrates this point.
Sketch of Proof. We need some preliminaries. First, define REU formally. Let
ΩE denote the set of all expected utility preferences over ∆. Let
NE(D,A) := {%∈ ΩE : A =M(D,%)}.
Then let
CE := {NE(D,A) : A,D ∈ D},
and let F(CE) denote the smallest field that contains every element of CE. A
random expected utility (REU) is a finitely additive probability measure µE on
(ΩE,F(CE)).
A class A of subsets of a set X is called a semiring if (i) ∅ ∈ A; (ii) if A,B ∈ A
then A ∩ B ∈ A; (iii) if A,B ∈ A then A \ B = ∪mk=1Ck for some mutually
disjoint sets C1, · · · , Cm ∈ A. Say that A is a semifield if it is a semiring and
X ∈ A. A set function is a mapping ν : A → R. The set function ν is finitely
additive if ν(∪mi=1Ai) =
∑m
i=1 ν(Ai) for any finite collection of mutually disjoint
sets {A1, · · · , Am} ⊂ A such that ∪
m
i=1Ai ∈ A.
The argument for the unique identification of REU is the following. Given
RCC ρ, define a set function µ∗E : CE → [0, 1] such that µ
∗
E(NE(D,A)) = ρD(A)
for all NE(D,A) ∈ CE . Suppose that ρ is rationalized by REU. Then µ
∗
E is a
finitely additive set function. Since CE is a semifield, the extension theorem (Rao
and Rao, 1983, Theorem 3.5.1) applies, and the set function µ∗E can be extended
to a finitely additive measure µE on F(CE). Moreover, such extension is unique.
Hence µE is the unique REU that rationalizes ρ.
The key to the uniqueness of REU is that CE is a semifield. This ensures that
the extension of µ∗E is unique. To identify RIEU, define C by (1) and then define a
set function µ∗ : C → [0, 1] such that, for all N(D,A) ∈ C, µ∗(N(D,A)) = ρD(A).
RIEU µ rationalizes ρ if and only if it is an extension of µ∗. However, C is not a
semifield. Hence the extension of µ∗ may not be unique. If, on (Ω,F(C)), there
exist two different probability measures µ and µ′ that both agree with µ∗ on C,
then both of them are RIEUs and rationalize ρ.
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The class C fails to be a semifield because it is not closed under finite intersec-
tions. That is, even if N(D,A) and N(D′, A′) are both in C, N(D,A)∩N(D′, A′)
may be not. This reflects the fact that, under RIEU, random choice does not
reveal the joint distribution of choice across two menus. That is, ρ does not give
the joint probability that A is the set of all optimal lotteries in D and A′ is the
set of all optimal lotteries in D′.
For example, consider RIEUs µ and µ′ defined in Section 3.1. Let p = (0, 12 ),
q = (14 ,
3
4 ), p
′ = (12 , 0) and q
′ = (34 ,
1
4). They are depicted in Figures 2 and 3.
Note that p ≻1 (≻
′
1)q and p
′ ≺1 (≻
′
1)q
′, and that p ≺2 (≺
′
2)q and p
′ ≻2 (≺
′
2)q
′.
Therefore, under µ, the probability that p is chosen over q and p′ is chosen over
q′ is 0. However, under µ′, this probability equals 12 . Thus, µ and µ
′ disagree on
the joint distribution of choice across {p, q} and {p′, q′}.10
On the other hand, the class CE is closed under finite intersections because,
for any λ ∈ (0, 1),11
NE(D,A) ∩NE(D
′, A′) = NE(λD + (1− λ)D
′, λA+ (1− λ)A′) ∈ CE.
This follows from the independence axiom of expected utility. Specifically, for
any expected utility preference %E , {p, q} ⊂ D, {p
′, q′} ⊂ D′, and λ ∈ (0, 1),
p %E q ⇔ λp+ (1− λ)p
′ %E λq + (1− λ)p
′;
p′ %E q
′ ⇔ λp+ (1− λ)p′ %E λp+ (1− λ)q
′.
These imply that λp+(1−λ)p′ is optimal in λD+(1−λ)D′ if and only if p and
p′ are optimal in D and D′ respectively. In words, under REU, the distribution
of choice from the mixture of D and D′ reveals the joint distribution of choice
across D and D′. Once we deviate from REU, we may lose such information
from random choice.
For a given random utility model, a natural question is what is the minimal
requirement on choice data for unique identification. Or at least, one would like
10Similarly, in our second example, v1 and v2 could be distinguished if we were given joint dis-
tributions of choice across two menus. Consider menus {p, q} and {p′, q′}, where p′ = 1
2
p + 1
2
r and
q′ = 1
2
q + 1
2
r for some r. Under ν1, the probability of p being chosen from {p, q} and q′ being chosen
from {p′, q′} is positive. Under ν2, that probability is zero. In other words, if ν1 is the actual dis-
tribution of preferences, then with positive probability, the joint choice will violate the independence
axiom .
11Define mixtures of menus D and D′ by λD + (1 − λ)D′ := {λp+ (1 − λ)p′ : p ∈ D, p′ ∈ D′} for
any λ ∈ (0, 1].
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to know how to enrich data to narrow down the set of rationalizing random pref-
erences. The above discussion suggests that collecting data on joint frequencies
of choice across different menus may be helpful.
Regardless of the domain of preferences, if the joint distribution of choice
across any number of menus is observable, then the distribution of preferences is
uniquely recoverable. It is because the class
{∩ki=1N(Di, Ai) : Ai,Di ∈ D ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ k; k ≥ 1}
is closed under finite intersection. Such class is called a pi-system. If two prob-
ability measures agree on a pi-system that generates the field where they are
defined, then they are identical.12
However, it seems far-fetched to assume that all joint distributions of choice
are observable. An advantage of REU is that no joint choice distribution is
needed to identify the distribution of preferences. If we deviate from REU but
still consider a restrictive domain of preferences, then joint distributions of choice
across a limited number of menus might be sufficient. Our last result for random
weighted utility demonstrates this point.
What are the minimal observations to completely determine a weighted utility
preference on the Marschak-Machina triangle? If we know p ∼ q, p′ ∼ q′, and
p′′ ≻ q′′, then we can infer the entire indifference map. This is because the
lines ←→pq and
←→
p′q′ determine the intersection point of all the indifference curves,
and then p′′ ≻ q′′ determines the direction of the increasing preference. A similar
result holds for random weighted utility: Joint distributions of choice across three
binary menus pin down a unique distribution of weighted utility preferences.
Proposition 4. Suppose that there are three prizes. Suppose that the joint distri-
bution of choice across any three binary menus is observable. Then such behavior
is rationalizable by at most one random weighted utility.
Proof. Now Ω denotes the set of all weighted utility preferences. The class C is
still defined by (1), and F(C) is the smallest field generated by C.
As shown in Appendix C, if two random weighted utilities µ and µ′ agree on
the class
{∩3i=1N({pi, qi}, Ai) : Ai ⊂ {pi, qi} ⊂ ∆ ∀ i = 1, · · · , 3},
then they also agree on the class
E := {∩ki=1N({pi, qi}, Ai) : Ai ⊂ {pi, qi} ⊂ ∆ ∀ i = 1, · · · , k; k ≥ 1}.
12This follows from Dynkin’s pi-λ theorem.
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The class E is a pi-system. Moreover, the smallest field generated by E is also
F(C). Therefore, µ and µ′ agree on F(C).
The key is that the joint distribution of choice across any four or more binary
menus can be deduced from the observable. Figure 7 illustrates. There are
four pairs of lotteries, {(pi, qi)}
4
i=1. If pi ≻ qi, then % rotates at some point (the
intersection of all its indifference curves) in one side of the line←→piqi clockwise (the
direction of increasing preference), or in another side counterclockwise. Thus, in
Figure 7(a), if pi ≻ qi for all i, then % rotates at some point in the blue area
clockwise, or in the green area counterclockwise.
In Figure 7(b), we plot three additional lotteries r, s, and t. The lines ←→rs
and
←→
rt divide the blue and green areas into five regions. Note that, for instance,
if r ≻ s, t ≻ r, and p4 ≻ q4, then % rotates at some point in the region R2
clockwise, or in R5 counterclockwise. One can verify that
pi ≻ qi ∀ i = 1, · · · , 4⇐⇒ (p1 ≻ q1 ∧ p2 ≻ q2 ∧ s ≻ r)
∨ (r % s ∧ t % r ∧ p4 ≻ q4) (2)
∨ (p1 ≻ q1 ∧ r ≻ t ∧ p3 ≻ q3) .
The right-hand side is a disjunction of three mutually exclusive statements. Let
PD1,D2,D3 denote the joint distribution of choice across menus D1, D2, and D3.
Then (2) implies that
Probability that pi is chosen from {pi, qi} for all i = 1, · · · , 4
=P{p1,q1},{p2,q2},{r,s} (p1, p2, s) + P{r,s},{r,t},{p4,q4} (r ∨ {r, s}, t ∨ {r, t}, p4)
+ P{p1,q1},{r,t},{p3,q3} (p1, r, p3) .
Therefore, although the joint probability that pi is chosen over qi for all i =
1, · · · , 4 is not observed directly, it is implicitly revealed through the observ-
ables. Once we have joint distributions of choice across three binary menus, we
automatically get all joint choice probabilities. Hence we can identify a unique
distribution of preferences.
5 Conclusions
This paper addresses the identification of random utility in a three-prize setting of
choice under risk. When risk preferences conform to the expected utility theory,
the distribution of preferences is uniquely recoverable from random choice of
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Figure 7
(a): Suppose that % is a weighted utility preference. Then pi ≻ qi for all i = 1, · · · , 4 if
and only if % rotates at some point in the blue area clockwise or rotates at some point in
the green area counterclockwise.
(b): Suppose that % is a weighted utility preference. Then p1 ≻ q1, p2 ≻ q2, and s ≻ r if
and only if % rotates at some point in the area R1; r ≻ s, t ≻ r, and p4 ≻ q4 if and only
if % rotates at some point in the area R2 or R5; p1 ≻ q1, r ≻ t, and p3 ≻ q3 if and only if
% rotates at some point in the area R3 or R4.
lotteries. But such uniqueness fails in general if risk preferences deviate from
expected utility. We show by example that even if preferences are confined
to a specific class of non-expected utility, such as the betweenness class or a
subclass, non-uniqueness can obtain. On the other hand, unique identification
is not hopeless at all. We find that if risk preferences conform to the weighted
utility theory and are monotone in first-order stochastic dominance, then the
distribution of preferences is again uniquely recoverable from random choice. In
general, collecting data on joint choice distributions across different menus can
improve identification. If preferences are suitably restricted, random joint choice
across a small number of menus will suffice for unique identification.
The paper is illustrative but does not dive into any particular model of ran-
dom non-expected utility. Many classes of non-expected utility are not con-
sidered in this paper, such as rank-dependent expected utility (Quiggin, 1982),
disappointment-averse utility (Gul, 1991), or cautious expected utility (Cerreia-
Vioglio et al., 2015). A random utility modeler may choose a domain of pref-
erences based on what describes each individual’s behavior better in her belief.
But she may also rather select a model with a unique identification. This paper
points out a generic difficulty a modeler may face and suggests some possible
solutions. Nonetheless, a comprehensive study of random non-expected utility is
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beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research.
Appendices
A Representation of Betweenness Preference
A betweenness preference has the following representation.
Proposition A.1 (Implicit Expected Utility Representation). A preference over
∆ is a betweenness preference if and only if there exists u(·, ·) : W × [0, 1] → R,
continuous in the second argument, such that p % q ⇔ V (p) ≥ V (q), where V (p)
is defined implicitly as the unique v ∈ [0, 1] that solves
n+1∑
i=1
u(wi, v)p
i = vu(w¯, v) + (1− v)u(w, v). (3)
Furthermore, u(w, v) is unique up to positive affine transformations which are
continuous in v. A particular transformation exists setting u(w, v) = 0 and
u(w¯, v) = 1 for all v ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. See Dekel (1986, Proposition A.1).
B Behavioral Properties of RIEU
For any D,D′ ∈ D and λ, λ′ ≥ 0, let λD + λ′D′ := {λx + λ′y : x ∈ D, y ∈ D′}.
Note that λD + λ′D′ is also a menu.
For any convex set C, a convex set F ⊂ C is called a face of C if for all
x, y ∈ C and λ ∈ (0, 1),
λx+ (1− λ)y ∈ F ⇒ {x, y} ⊂ F.
For any set A, let chA denote the convex hull of A. For any D,A ∈ D, we say
that A is a face of D if chA is a face of chD and chA ∩D = A.
Axiom B.1. Monotonicity: ρD(A) ≤ ρD\B(A \ B) for all D,A,B ∈ D with
A \B 6= ∅.
Monotonicity captures the intuition that the probability of lottery p being
optimal does not decrease as some lotteries are removed from the menu. This
property holds under any random utility model.
21
Axiom B.2. Extremeness: ρD(A) > 0 implies that A is a face of D, for all
A,D ∈ D.
Extremeness states that lotteries p and q are both optimal whenever a mixture
of them is optimal. This property reflects the fact that each indifference set of a
betweenness preference is linear.
Axiom B.3. Stochastic Betweenness: ρλD+(1−λ)p(λA + (1 − λ)p) = ρD(A) for
all p ∈ A ⊂ D ∈ D, λ ∈ (0, 1).
Stochastic Betweenness states that the probability of lottery p being optimal
remains unchanged when each other lottery q in the menu is replaced by a mixture
of p and q. This property captures the betweenness axiom, which requires that
a mixture of two lotteries should lie in between them in preference.
Proposition B.1. If ρ is rationalized by RIEU, then ρ satisfies Monotonicity,
Extremeness, and Stochastic Betweenness.
Proof. Suppose that ρ is rationalized by RIEU µ.
Monotonicity: If A =M(D,%), then A\B =M(D \B,%). Thus N(D,A) ⊂
N(D \B,A \B). It follows that ρD(A) = µ(N(D,A)) ≤ µ(N(D \ B,A \ B)) =
ρD\B(A \B). Hence ρ satisfies Monotonicity.
Extremeness: Suppose that A =M(D,%), where % is a betweenness prefer-
ence. Betweenness property implies that p ∼ p′ for all p, p′ ∈ chA, and p ≻ p′′
for all p ∈ chA and p′′ ∈ chD \ chA. Thus chA = M(chD,%). Suppose that
p ∈ chA and p = λq + (1 − λ)r where λ ∈ (0, 1) and {q, r} ⊂ chD. Since p is
optimal, p % q and p % r. If p ≻ q or p ≻ r, then by betweenness property,
p ≻ λq + (1− λ)r = p, a contradiction. Hence p ∼ q ∼ r, implying that q and r
are both in chA. Thus chA is a face of chD. Since A =M(D,%), chA∩D = A.
Thus A is a face of D and so ρ satisfies Extremeness.
Stochastic Betweenness: Suppose that p ∈ A = M(D,%), where % is a
betweenness preference. Then for all q ∈ A and r ∈ D \ A, p ∼ q and p ≻ r. By
betweenness property, p ∼ λq+ (1− λ)p and p ≻ λr+ (1− λ)p for all λ ∈ (0, 1).
Hence N(D,A) ⊂ N(λD + (1 − λ)p, λA + (1 − λ)p). The argument can be
reversed to conclude that N(D,A) ⊃ N(λD + (1 − λ)p, λA + (1 − λ)p). Thus
ρλD+(1−λ)p(λA+ (1− λ)p) = ρD(A). So ρ satisfies Stochastic Betweenness.
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C Proof of Proposition 4
We want to show that if two random weighted utilities µ and µ′ agree on the
class
E0 := {∩
3
i=1N({pi, qi}, Ai) : Ai ⊂ {pi, qi} ⊂ ∆ ∀ i = 1, · · · , 3},
then they also agree on the class
E := {∩ki=1N({pi, qi}, Ai) : Ai ⊂ {pi, qi} ⊂ ∆ ∀ i = 1, · · · , k; k ≥ 1}.
This would be true if any E ∈ E can be expressed as E = ∪Mm=1Em, where
Em ∈ E0 for all m, and Em ∩ Em′ = ∅ for all m 6= m
′.
Consider four pairs of lotteries, (pi, qi) for i = 1, · · · , 4. Let Li denote the
line ←→piqi. Each Li divides R
2 into two half spaces, H+i and H
−
i . Without loss
of generality, assume that pi % qi if % rotates at some point in H
+
i clockwise or
rotates at some point in H−i counterclockwise.
We want to show that the set {%: pi % qi ∀ i = 1 · · · , 4} can be decomposed
into finitely many mutually disjoint subsets. Moreover, each subset takes the
form {%: rj ≻ sj ∨ rj ∼ sj ∀ j = 1 · · · , 3}. By induction, we can extend the
claim to the case of more than four pairs of lotteries.
It suffices to show the following: There exist rjk, sjk for j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
k ∈ {1, · · · ,K} such that
∩4i=1{%: pi % qi} = ∪
K
k=1
(
∩3j=1{%: rjk % sjk}
)
,
and, for all k 6= k′,
(
∩3j=1{%: rjk % sjk}
)
∩
(
∩3j=1{%: rjk′ % sjk′}
)
⊂ {%: r ∼ s}
for some r, s ∈ ∆.
If Li = Lj for some i 6= j, then the claim is trivial. Now assume that Li 6= Lj
for all i 6= j. Without loss of generality, assume that ∩4i=1H
+
i 6= ∅.
Case 1: ∩4i=1H
+
i has only 1 one-dimensional face. That is, it is a half space.
Without loss of generality, assume that H+1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ H
+
4 . Then H
−
1 ⊃ · · · ⊃
H−4 . Suppose that p1 % q1 and p4 % q4. Then % either rotates at some point
in H+1 clockwise or rotates at some point in H
−
4 counterclockwise. Thus p2 % q2
and p3 % q3. We have
∩4i=1{%: pi % qi} = {%: p1 % q1} ∩ {%: p4 % q4}.
Case 2: ∩4i=1H
+
i has two one-dimensional faces. Without loss of generality,
assume that L1 ∦ L2 and ∩
4
i=1H
+
i = H
+
1 ∩H
+
2 .
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Case 2-1: L1 ‖ L2. Then H
−
1 ∩ H
−
2 = ∅. If p1 % q1 and p2 % q2, then %
rotates at some point in H+1 ∩ H
+
2 clockwise. Thus p3 % q3 and p4 % q4. We
have
∩4i=1{%: pi % qi} = {%: p1 % q1} ∩ {%: p2 % q2}.
Case 2-2: L1 ∦ L2 and L3 ‖ L4. Without loss of generality, assumeH
+
3 ⊂ H
+
4 .
Then ∩4i=1H
+
i = H
+
1 ∩H
+
2 ∩H
+
4 and ∩
4
i=1H
−
i = H
−
1 ∩H
−
2 ∩H
−
4 . Thus
∩4i=1{%: pi % qi} = {%: p1 % q1} ∩ {%: p2 % q2} ∩ {%: p4 % q4}.
Case 2-3: L1 ∦ L2, L3 ∦ L4, and L1 ∩ L2 ⊂ ∆. If L3 ∩ L4 6⊂ int(H
−
1 ∩H
−
2 ),
then either L3 or L4 is redundant. That is, without loss of generality, ∩
4
i=1H
+
i =
H+1 ∩H
+
2 ∩H
+
3 and ∩
4
i=1H
−
i = H
−
1 ∩H
−
2 ∩H
−
3 . Thus
∩4i=1{%: pi % qi} = {%: p1 % q1} ∩ {%: p2 % q2} ∩ {%: p3 % q3}.
Now, consider L3∩L4 ⊂ int(H
−
1 ∩H
−
2 ). Let r ∈ ∆ denote the intersection of
L1 and L2. Pick s ∈ ∆ such that
←→rs passes L3∩L4. Note that
←→rs dividesH+1 ∩H
+
2
into two fans. Let H+5 and H
−
5 denote the half spaces generated by
←→rs such that
H+1 ∩H
+
2 = (H
+
1 ∩H
+
5 ) ∪ (H
−
5 ∩H
+
2 ). Without loss of generality, assume that
r % s if % rotates at some point in H+5 clockwise and that H
−
5 ∩H
−
3 ⊂ H
−
5 ∩H
−
4 .
Then,
(
∩4i=1H
+
i
)
∪
(
∩4i=1H
−
i
)
=
[
(H+1 ∩H
+
3 ∩H
+
5 ) ∪ (H
−
1 ∩H
−
3 ∩H
−
5 )
]
∪
[
(H+2 ∩H
+
4 ∩H
−
5 ) ∪ (H
−
2 ∩H
−
4 ∩H
+
5 )
]
.
This implies that
∩4i=1{pi % qi} = ({p1 % q1} ∩ {p3 % q3} ∩ {r % s})∪({p2 % q2} ∩ {p4 % q4} ∩ {r - s})
Case 2-4: L1 ∦ L2, L3 ∦ L4, and L1 ∩ L2 6⊂ int∆. Without loss of generality,
assume that {p2, q2} ⊂ H
+
1 . As in the previous case, we shall consider L3 ∩L4 ⊂
int(H−1 ∩H
−
2 ).
Pick a lottery r that is a strict mixture of p2 and q2. Pick s1 ∈ ∆ such that
←→rs1 ‖ L1. Let H
+
5 and H
−
5 denote the half spaces generated by
←→rs1 such that
H+5 ⊂ H
+
1 . Without loss of generality, assume that r % s1 if % rotates at some
point in H+5 clockwise.
Pick s2 ∈ ∆ such that
←→rs2 passes L3 ∩ L4. Let H
+
6 and H
−
6 denote the half
spaces generated by←→rs2 such that H
+
5 ∩H
+
2 = (H
+
5 ∩H
+
6 )∪(H
−
6 ∩H
+
2 ). Without
loss of generality, assume that r % s2 if % rotates at some point in H
−
6 clockwise
and that H+6 ∩H
−
4 ⊂ H
+
6 ∩H
−
3 .
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Then
(
∩4i=1H
+
i
)
∪
(
∩4i=1H
−
i
)
=
[
(H+1 ∩H
+
2 ∩H
−
5 ) ∪ (H
−
1 ∩H
−
2 ∩H
+
5 )
]
∪
[
(H+2 ∩H
+
4 ∩H
−
6 ) ∪ (H
−
2 ∩H
−
4 ∩H
+
6 )
]
∪
[
(H+1 ∩H
+
3 ∩H
+
5 ∩H
+
6 ) ∪ (H
−
1 ∩H
−
3 ∩H
−
5 ∩H
−
6 )
]
.
This implies that
∩4i=1{pi % qi} =({p1 % q1} ∩ {p2 % q2} ∩ {r - s1})
∪ ({p2 % q2} ∩ {p4 % q4} ∩ {r % s2})
∪ ({p1 ≻ q1} ∩ {p3 ∩ q3} ∩ {r % s1} ∩ {r - s2})
Note that {p1 ≻ q1} ∩ {p3 ∩ q3} ∩ {r % s1} ∩ {r - s2} can be decomposed as in
Case 2-3.
Case 3: ∩4i=1H
+
i has three one-dimensional faces. Without loss of generality,
assume that ∩4i=1H
+
i = H
+
1 ∩H
+
2 ∩H
+
3 , L1 ∦ L2, and L2 ∦ L3.
Case 3-1: L1 ‖ L3 or ∩
3
i=1H
+
i is bounded. Note that ∩
3
i=1H
−
i = ∅. Thus
∩4i=1{pi % qi} = {p1 % q1} ∩ {p2 % q2} ∩ {p3 % q3}.
Case 3-2: L1 ∦ L3, L1 ∩ L3 ⊂ H
−
2 ∩H
−
4 . Note that H
−
1 ∩H
−
3 ⊂ H
−
4 . Thus,(
∩4i=1H
+
i
)
∪
(
∩4i=1H
−
i
)
=
(
∩3i=1H
+
i
)
∪
(
∩3i=1H
−
i
)
.
Therefore,
∩4i=1{pi % qi} = {p1 % q1} ∩ {p2 % q2} ∩ {p3 % q3}.
Case 3-3: L1 ∦ L3, L1∩L3 ⊂ H
−
2 ∩ intH
+
4 , and [(L1∩L2)∪(L2∩L3)]∩∆ 6= ∅.
Without loss of generality, assume that L2 ∩ L3 ≡ {r} ⊂ int∆. Pick s ∈ ∆
such that ←→rs passes the intersection of L1 and L4. Let H
+
5 and H
−
5 denote the
half spaces generated by←→rs such that ∩3i=1H
+
i = (H
+
1 ∩H
+
2 ∩H
+
5 )∪ (H
−
5 ∩H
+
3 ).
Without loss of generality, assume that r % s if % rotates at some point in H−5
clockwise. Then
(
∩4i=1H
+
i
)
∪
(
∩4i=1H
−
i
)
=
[(
H+1 ∩H
+
2 ∩H
+
5
)
∪
(
H−1 ∩H
−
2 ∩H
−
5
)]
∪
[(
H+3 ∩H
+
4 ∩H
−
5
)
∪
(
H−3 ∩H
−
4 ∩H
+
5
)]
.
This implies that
∩4i=1{pi % qi} =({p1 % q1} ∩ {p2 % q2} ∩ {s % r})
∪ ({p3 % q3} ∩ {p4 % q4} ∩ {r % s}) .
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Case 3-4: L1 ∦ L3, L1∩L3 ⊂ H
−
2 ∩ intH
+
4 , and [(L1∩L2)∪(L2∩L3)]∩∆ = ∅.
Without loss of generality, assume that {p2, q2} ⊂ H
−
3 . Let L5 denote the
line passing L2 ∩ L3 and parallel to L1. Note that L5 must intersect ∆ at two
points, say r and s. One may pick r as a mixture of p2 and p1, s as a mixture
of p2 and q1. Let H
+
5 and H
−
5 denote the half spaces generated by L5 such that
∩3i=1H
+
i = (H
+
1 ∩H
+
2 ∩H
+
5 ) ∪ (H
−
5 ∩H
+
3 ). Without loss of generality, assume
that r % s if % rotates at some point in H−5 clockwise. Then(
∩4i=1H
+
i
)
∪
(
∩4i=1H
−
i
)
=
[(
H+1 ∩H
+
2 ∩H
+
5
)
∪
(
H−1 ∩H
−
2 ∩H
−
5
)]
∪
[(
H+1 ∩H
+
3 ∩H
+
4 ∩H
−
5
)
∪
(
H−1 ∩H
−
3 ∩H
−
4 ∩H
+
5
)]
.
Therefore,
∩4i=1{pi % qi} =({p1 % q1} ∩ {p2 % q2} ∩ {s % r})
∪ ({p1 % q1} ∩ {p3 % q3} ∩ {p4 % q4} ∩ {r % s}) .
Note that {p1 % q1} ∩ {p3 % q3} ∩ {p4 % q4} ∩ {r % s} can be decomposed as in
Case 2-4.
Case 4: ∩4i=1H
+
i has four one-dimensional faces. Without loss of generality,
assume that L1 ∦ L2; L2 ∦ L3 and L2 ∩ L3 ⊂ H
+
1 ; L3 ∦ L4 and L3 ∩ L4 ⊂ H
+
2 .
Case 4-1: ∩4i=1H
+
i is bounded; that is, it is a convex polygon with four edges.
Note that, for at least one diagonal, the line containing it intersects ∆ at more
than one point. Without loss of generality, pick r, s ∈ ∆ such that ←→rs passes
L2 ∩ L3 and L1 ∩ L4. Let H
+
5 and H
−
5 denote the half spaces generated by
←→rs
such that L3 ∩ L4 ⊂ H
+
5 . Without loss of generality, assume that r % s if %
rotates at some point in H+5 clockwise. Then(
∩4i=1H
+
i
)
∪
(
∩4i=1H
−
i
)
=
[(
H+1 ∩H
+
2 ∩H
−
5
)
∪
(
H−1 ∩H
−
2 ∩H
+
5
)]
∪
[(
H+3 ∩H
+
4 ∩H
+
5
)
∪
(
H−3 ∩H
−
4 ∩H
−
5
)]
.
This implies that
∩4i=1{pi % qi} =({p1 % q1} ∩ {p2 % q2} ∩ {s % r})
∪ ({p3 % q3} ∩ {p4 % q4} ∩ {r % s}) .
Case 4-2: L1 ‖ L4. Let L5 be the line that passes L2 ∩ L3 and is parallel to
L1 and L4. Note that L5 intersects ∆ at more than one point. One may pick
r ∈ L5 as a mixture of p1 and p4, s ∈ L5 as a mixture of p1 and q4. Then follow
the same argument as in Case 4-1.
Case 4-3: L1 ∩L4 ⊂ H
−
2 ∩H
−
3 . Note that ∩
4
i=1H
−
i = H
−
1 ∩H
−
4 , i.e., ∩
4
i=1H
−
i
has only two one-dimensional faces. We go back to Case 2.
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